A Special Forces Human Rights Policy by Jeffrey F. Addicott
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In Murphy, the IRS took the position that since both of the 
parties had not rolled over the gain on the sale of their house the 
entire gain on the sale of the house was taxable.126 The IRS has 
now reversed its position and agrees with the Tax Court that only 
one-half of the gain is taxable under these circumstances. 127 
120 103 T.C. 111, 113 (1994). 
127 AOD 1996-007 (July IS, 1996). 
Thus, when a married couple sel1s their house, files a joint 
return, subsequently divorces, and only one of them purchases a 
replacement home, they are jointly and severally liable for one-
half of the gain on the sale of their principal residence. Legal 
assistance attorneys should consider the impact on their clients 
when advising them whether to file a joint return if they are sell-
ing a home and seeking a divorce. Major Henderson. 
Notes from the Field 
A Special Forces Human Rights Policy 
The Initiative 
The use of the United States military to promote human rights 
values in foreign militaries has taken on a much added signifi-
cance in the post Cold War era. Emerging democracies often 
look to American soldiers to assist them in establishing a law-
based military whose policies, rules, and practices are rooted in 
respect for human rights. 1 
Although the term "human rights" does not immediately bring 
to mind images of Special Forces soldiers in action, the decade 
of the '90s has witnessed the use of "Green Berets" in missions 
that reflect America's desire to inculcate human rights values in 
the militaries of our friends and allies. Special Forces soldiers 
have proved themselves as premier ambassadors in this regard. 
Indeed, promoting human rights in the militaries of the nascent 
democracies is clearly a priority mission for the Special Forces, 
an organization uniquely qualified for such a task. 
Shortly after assuming command of the United States Army 
Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC(A)) in May 
1996,1 Major General Kenneth Bowra took swift action to en-
sure that all Special Forces soldiers thoroughly understood their 
rights and responsibilities regarding human rights vis a vis the 
host nation military. A first ever Special Forces Human Rights 
Policy Memorandum3 issued by General Bowra addressed four 
areas of concern. 
First, all military personnel assigned to USASFC(A) or sub-
ordinate units deployed outside the continental United States, 
either in permanent or temporary status, will receive human rights 
awareness training. This training will be conducted by their re-
spective legal advisors prior to deployment. 
Second, deployed personnel will report all instances of sus-
.,CCted gross violations of internationally recognized human rights 
immediately through the chain of command. All such reports 
will be included in after action reports (AARs). 
Third, so far as practicable, Special Forces commanders will 
plan for and include human rights training as part of all training 
provided to host nation military forces. Furthermore, command-
1 Specifically, a state violates international human rights law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones seven types of actions that have gained 
universal recognition as "gross violations" of internationally recognized human rights. Set out at Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations lAw of the United 
States (1987) § 702, Customary International Law of Human Rights, those seven gross violations consist of: (I) genocide; (2) slavery or slave trade; (3) the murder 
or causing the disappearance of individuals; (4) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (S) prolonged arbitrary detention; (6) system-
atic racial discrimination; or (7) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. 
l Headquarters, United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The eommand consists of five active duty Special 
Forces groups and two reserve groups. The active duty groups are located as follows: 1st Group, Fort Lewis, Washington; 3d Group, Fort Bragg, North Caroiina; 5th 
Group, Fort Campbell. Kentucky; 7th Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and lOth Group, Fort Carson, Colorado. 
3 Memorandum, Commander, United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), to subordinate commands, subject: USASFC(A) Human Rights Policy (18 
Aug. 96). · . 
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ers are required to review exercise and deployment AARs to 
evaluate the effect of human rights training initiatives on host 
nation military . forces and then make recommenctations to the 
USASFC(A) Commanding General for improvement. 
Finally, the four page memorandum requires the USASFC(A) 
Staff Judge Advocate to: 
(1) ensure that all Special Forces group judge advocates 
(GJA) undergo a human rights training program tailored to their 
area of responsibility (AOR), which is given to deployed sol-
diers; 
(2) assist each Special Forces Group to develop appropriate 
human rights training programs that can be delivered to host na-
tion military forces; and 
(3) as opportunities arise, coordinate with host nation legal 
counterparts to assess host nation military human rights training 
programs and, as appropriate, recommend improvements to those 
programs. 
Major General Bowra issued the human rights policy because 
he be1ieves that an effective and efficient method of meeting the 
challenges of '~regional crisis" and "threats to democracy" is to 
reduce the chance of such activities arising in the ftrst place.4 
One way to achieve this is to install in the host nation militaries 
a healthy respect for human rights. 
The sweeping requirements mandated by the OSASFC(A) 
policy memorandum, particularly as they. apply to training host 
nation forces, are not as difficult as they might first appear. In 
large part, the militaries of many emerging democracies already 
look to Army Special Forces as a model to assist them in defin-
ing how human rights concerns should properly function in their 
respective military establishments and how that military itself 
should fit into a more democratic form of government. Foreign 
militaries instinctively tum to the United States Army Special 
Forces for the following reasons. 
First, the Special Forces are uniquely positioned t~ influe~ce 
the attitudes and, in some cases, even the structure and function· 
of the host nation military because they go where no other ele-
ment of the United States military can. As noted by Lieutenant 
General (retired) William P. Yarborough, "Other than Special 
Forces, there is no element of the [United States] armed forces 
that is capable of performing across the entire spectrum of what 
is labeled, for want of a better term, low intensity conflict."' 
Special Forces soldiers perform hundreds of missions each 
year in support of the warfighting commanders in chief and other 
government agencies. These operations span the entire spec-
trum of conflict, to include dire~t action, foreign internal defense, 
special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, security assis-
tance training, humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics, 
demining, and combating terrorism. Simply put, when it comes 
to operating with host nation forces, Green Berets are every-
where doing everything. The deployment figures tell the tale. In . 
Fiscal Year 1995, for example, Special Forces soldiers deployed 
on 1593 missions to 184 countries around the world. 
Second, because Special Forces soldiers are extensively 
trained in the language, culture, religion, and politics of the coun-
tries in which they operate, they are best able to foster genuine 
military-to-military relationships. This applies to individual host 
nations as well as to geographic regions. Thus, because of their 
ability to perceive cultural nuances, Special Forces can tailor 
each particular mission to make the maximum impression on their 
military counterparts re.garding the importance of human rights 
concerns. 
Third, more than any other arm of the United States military, 
Special Forces exemplify to foreign militaries the success story 
of a professional military force that can maintain a superb opera-
tional record while functioning in accord with human rights con-
cerns. Almost without exception, foreign soldiers .are deeply 
impressedwith how human rights and military effici~ncy can go : 
hand-in-hand. Foreign forces know that, to the Green Berets, · 
concern for human rights has always been the sine quo non in 
United States military operations. 
Indeed, the promotion of international human rights and demo- .. 
. . . 
cratic behavior have long been critical themes of the United States 
Army's Special Forces, regardless of the mission ihat they hap- · 
pen to be perloiming. President Kennedy routinely prais~ this,: 
unique quality, and no one who has followed the accomplish-
ments of Special Forces soldiers in operations Provide Comfort 
(Iraq and Turkey), Restore Hope (Somalia), Just Cause (Panama), ' 
Desert Storm (Middle East), Uphold Democracy (Haiti), and the 
Implementation Force (Bosnia) can doubt their value in this re-
gard. 
In short, United States Army Special Forces soldiers are uni-
versally recognized and respected as efficient, professional, and 
humanitarian in their conduct. Lieutenant General (retired) James 
T. Scott, the former Commander of United States Army Special 
Operations Command, stressed this truism during a speech in 
the summer of 1996. He stated, ·"I can tell you thatSpecialForces 
. i. 
·., I 
• The 1996 Defense Planning Guidance lists four primary challenges to United States security: (1) proliferation of nuclear weapons, (2) regional crisis, (3) threats to 
democracy, and (4) threats to economy. 
5 Lt. Gen. (ret.) William P. Yarborough, Emergi~g SOF Rules and Missions: A Different Perspective, Special Wacf~e. July 1995, at 10. 
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soldiers will . . . continue to serve as the conscience and the 
example of lesser developed nations regarding human rights."6 
Finally, the "De Oppresso Liber'' motto of Special Forces re-
flects a profound concern for the inherent dignity of those who 
are denied international human rights. Crossing all cultural and 
social boundaries, this mentality makes Special Forces soldiers 
an ideal models as they train host nation forces and assist in alle-
viating many of the conditions that breed human rights abuses. 
By word and deed, Special Forces promote the message that 
commitment to preserving human rights is the hallmark of a pro-
fessional military serving the interests of a democratic nation. 
This message is not lost on the host nation. For example, in 
Haiti (which now officially has no standing military force), Spe-
cial Forces worked closely with local citizens, political leaders, 
and foreign forces on a daily basis. Without question, the red 
thread that underlined every action taken in Haiti was the em-
phasis on respecting human rights. In the end, human rights con-
cerns took root, in large part, because of the professionalism of 
United States Army Special Forces. 
The most common opportunity for Special Forces to influ-
ence the human rights practices of the soldiers. of fledgling de-
mocracies, however, occurs during joint and combined exercises 
for training. Green Berets often are quizzed by their counter-
parts concerning how one should respond to human rights abuses 
committed by service members. Realizing that it is better to 
draw on American history (to avoid unnecessary controversy), 
Special Forces soldiers invariably rely on various American il-
lustrations, such as the lessons learned from My Lai,7 to explain 
the practical necessity for abiding by the law of war and interna-
tionally recognized human rights law. 
Invariably, the four basic points stressed to host nation sol-
diers are: (1) human rights abuses are never tolerated by a demo-
cratic populace (e.g., the American public); (2) such violations 
do not shorten the conflict, be it internal or external in nature, 
but usually have the opposite effect; (3) the soldiers guilty of 
human rights violations must be punished, or similar abuses wiU 
surely follow; and ( 4) to maintain discipline and esprit de corps, 
the chain of command must constantly train soldiers to respect 
internationally recognized human rights and the law of war. 
Group Judge Advocates 
The old adage that "you can't teach wbat you don't know" 
particularly applies to explaining and promoting human rights 
concerns to host nation military personnel. In preparing for op-
erational missions in developing democracies, SpeCial Forces 
soldiers and their commanders mus~ plan to specifically address 
this challenge. Even the team level predeployment briefings 
should anticipate human rights issues unique t9 the host nation. 
Requiring a great deal of sensitivity, human rights training 
packages that are specifically tailored to the wants and desires of 
the host nation military should be available at planning confer-
ences. Clearly, host nation forces are receptive to human rights 
discussions only when they are presented in a nonthreatening, 
nondemanding environment of instruction. In many cases, if the 
host nation is adverse to the idea of discussing human rights is-
sues, a very informal approach will reap the greatest dividends. 
In other instances, host nation forces ask for more formal in-
struction about how the United States military approaches hu-
man rights issues. 
To address the human rights concerns of individual nations, 
Special Forces soldiers and their commanders have many re-
sources available to them. The most important resource, other 
than a soldier's solid moral compass, is the GJA assigned to each 
Special Forces Group (there are five active duty Group legal 
offices). Each GJA is thoroughly trained in human rights law 
and has compiled an extensive collection of information dealing 
with human rights issues related to the Group's AOR.1 Apart 
from providing the mandatory predeployment legal briefings to 
all deploying soldiers, these specialized military attorneys stay 
abreast of current doctrine involving international agreements, 
changes in human rights doctrine, and political and social changes 
in the regions. 
The USASFC{A) Staff Judge Advocate requires all OJ As to 
maintain close contact with their military legal counterparts in as 
many host nations as possible. Group judge advocates engage in 
human rights training initiatives targeted at institutionalizing 
human rights training in foreign militaries. This approach has 
been extremely successful. Support from GJAs has ranged from 
assisting the Thai military in establishing a human rights training 
program for their junior military attorneys at the Royal Thai Mili-
tary Law School in Bangkok to developing human rights train-
ing handbooks for military coalition forces in Haiti.9 Special 
Forces OJ As have also worked closely with United Nations per-
sonnel in Haiti and Bosnia. 
Conclusion 
The post Cold War world presents new challenges to United 
States Army Special Forces. A window of opportunity now ex-
4 Lt. Gen. (m.) James T. Scott, Address at USASFC(A) Change of Command Ceremony (May 21, 1996) (transcript on file with Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 
USASFC{A)). 
1 See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott & William A. Hudson, 25th Anniversary of My Lai: nme to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 Mil. L. Rev. 153 (1993). 
a See USASFC(A) Human Rights Handbook (on file with the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. USASFC(A), Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 
9 Many of these initiatives have been conducted lhrough the Center for Law and Military Operations located at The Judge Advocate General's School, United States 
Anny, Chadottesville. Vil:ginia. 
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ists for Special Forces to make substantial contributions toward J 
building and strengthening human rights concerns in the militar~ ·· 
ies.of the emerging democracies. 
Just ten years ago hundreds of countries functioned under some 
form of nondemocratic rule (in Latin America alone, over ninety 
percent were nondemocratic). Today, the vast majority of these 
nations oj)emte under properly elected civilian governments, but 
great nations are neither created nor sustained by accident. tJnited, · 
States assistance is often required to help solidify and, in many 
cases, to create a true commitment to promoting and preserving 
human rights. ! 
Major General Bowra has made 'the prom~tion of human rights 
in the militaries of the eme~ging democracies a top priority for 
United States Army Special Forces.· Recognizing that this new 
mission cannot be accomplished without the proactive support 
of his legal advisors, he has given judge advocates a critical role 
in the process of promoting human rights .. We will not disa~ 
point. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey F. Addicott, Staff Judge Ad-
vocate, United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 
To Read or Not to Read. •. The Defense Counsel's 
Dilemma Provided by Article 31(b), UCM}10 
The Dilemma 
' . - ' . 
Military defense counsel seldom have the luxury of appointed 
investigators. They are generally left to their own skills in ac-
complishing both the pretrial investigation and preparation of 
the case for trial. A~cordingly, their ability to obtain informa- . 
tion is of paramount importance to the adequate representation 
of their clients. Their ability to obtain information, however, 
may be clouded by concerns about the litera] dictates of Article 
31(b), UniformCodeofMilitary Justice(UCMJ).11 Article 31(b) · 
provides: 
No person subject to this chapter may interro~ 
gate, or request any statement from, an accused 
or a person suspected of an offense without 
first informing him of the nature of the accu~ 
sation and advising him that he does not have 
to make any statement regarding the offense 
of which he is accused or suspected·and that 
any statement made by him may be used as 
evidence against him in a trial by court~mar­
tial.t2 
Thus, military defense . counsels ("person[ s 1 subject to this 
chapter") face an unusual. choice when interviewing a military 
witness that they suspect may have committed offenses. They 
must decide whether to advise the witness (suspecr) of his Ar-
ticle 31(b) rights, and possibly lose the witn~ss's testimony, or 
proceed by interviewing the witness without advising him and 
potentially violate Article 31(b). In the only decision on point, 
the United States Court otMilitary Appeals13 (COMA) held that 
military defense counsel should read Article 31 (b) rights when 
questioning suspects.14 
The ·author believes that recent case law indicates that the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces15 (CAAF) 
has eliminated this requirement. According to this view of case 
law, the CAAF has established new guidelines for Article 31 (b) 
rights warning requirements that do not require a literal interpre-' · 
tation of UCMJ Article 31 (b) and do not require military de-
fense counsel to read potential witnesses their rights wheri 
preparing to defend a case.16 
. i 
. . ' . . 
10 This note updates the article written by then Major John B. McDaniel entitled "Article 31(b) and the Defense Counsel Interview," which appeai:ed in the May· 
1990 issue ofT/u! Army Lawyer. See John B. McDaniel, Article 31 (b) and the Deje11Se Cou11Sel fnten1iew, A liMY LAw .• May 1990, at 9. The opinions expressed in this 
note are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the policy of The Trial Defense Service, The Judge Advocate General, or the Army. 
H 10 U.S.C. §831(b) (1988) (hereinafter Article 3l(b)). 
11 ld. 
13 On S November 1994, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, 108 Stat. 2663 (1994), changed the 1111IlleS of the United 
States Courts of Military Review and the United States Court of Military Appeals. The new names are the United States Courts of Criminal Appeals and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Anned Forces, respectively. For the puzposes of this note, the name of the court at the time that a panicular case was decided is the 
name that will be used in refening to that decision. See United States v. Sanders, 41 M.J. 485, n.t (1995). 
" United States v. Milbum, 8 MJ. 110 (C.M.A. 1979). 
''I . ' 
15 See supra note 13. 
J6 ·For an excellent discussion of the historical background of this subject and case law prior to 1990, see John B. McDaniel, Article JJ(bJ and the De/eliSe Counsel 
lnten~iew, ARMY LAw., May 1990, at 9. 
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